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
We surveyed the empirical literature using multi-country computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models to analyse potential and actual regional trade agreements
(RTAs). The studies indicate that these RTAs improve welfare, that trade creation
greatly exceeds trade diversion, and that they are consistent with further global
liberalisation. The welfare gains are bigger when models incorporate aspects of ‘‘new
trade theory’’ such as increasing returns, imperfect competition, and links between
trade liberalisation, total factor productivity growth, and capital accumulation. We
also conjectured that an RTA expands market size and stability, allowing ﬁrms to
pursue economies of ﬁne specialisation, generating additional ‘‘Smithian’’ eﬃciency
gains.
1. Introduction
In recent years, regional free trade agreements have proliferated.
1 Some, such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), involve a
developing country (Mexico) liberalising trade and deepening links with
developed countries (the USA and Canada). The expansion of the European
Union (EU) to include, ﬁrst, countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland;
and, second, central European countries, similarly expands links between
developing and developed countries – although the gaps are not as great
as that between Mexico and the USA. Other arrangements, such as
* This paper is based on an Invited Paper presented to the Trade Plenary at the Conference
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1 See Burﬁsher and Jones (1998, p. 11, table 1) for a detailed description of the types of
regional trade agreements and the degree of integration in each.
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Many of these new regional integration schemes have evolved during the
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which continued the postwar trend
of global trade liberalisation and also expanded the sectoral coverage to
include agriculture.
At the same time, intra-regional trade has grown (Frankel et al. 1995;
Vollrath 1998; Yeats 1998; Hertel et al. 1999; World Bank 2000). In some
RTAs, such as the European Common Market (Grubel and Lloyd 1971) and
NAFTA (Burﬁsher et al. 2001), there is evidence that intra-industry trade has
increased substantially.
The proliferation of RTAs has revived the debate over their welfare
implications and their impact on the global economy. One school of thought
(Bhagwati and Krueger 1995; Bhagwati and Panagariya 1996; Srinivasan
1998) views RTAs as a bad idea, reducing welfare for their members and
detracting from eﬀorts to expand global liberalisation under the new World
Trade Organisation (WTO). Others, such as Ethier (1998), argue that RTAs
reﬂect a ‘‘new regionalism’’ which complements multilateralism and that they
are evidence that developing countries want to participate in a multilateral
system currently dominated by developed countries. Another issue is the
importance of proximity. Krugman (1993) notes that there are natural
trading blocs among neighbouring countries – low transportation costs
contribute to welfare gains when these countries form an RTA. There is also
a view that countries seek to join RTAs because of fear of exclusion – the
domino theory of regionalism described by Baldwin and Venables (1995).
In this debate, there are three important issues which can only be resolved
with empirical models. First, do RTAs increase welfare? Trade theory is
ambiguous on this point, noting that there can be both trade creation which
increases welfare and trade diversion which reduces welfare. Theory oﬀers few
insights as to which change will dominate. Second, do RTAs hinder or help
multilateral free trade? On this point, empirical models can show the eﬀects of
being excluded from an RTA and also consider the impact on member
countries of joining an RTA compared to further global liberalisation.
Finally, where are the big numbers? Empirical studies of growth in both
developing and developed countries support the view that trade liberalisation
policies have led to increased trade and have been associated with welfare
gains and more rapid growth. What are the sources of these substantial gains?
In the present paper, we argue that virtually all the RTAs studied improve
welfare for member countries. First, we review the theory of trade creation
and trade diversion which has been used in the current debate over the
welfare eﬀects of RTAs. We then consider the voluminous empirical
2 The original members of MERCOSUR are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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3 The results
from a large number of model-based empirical studies strongly support a few
robust conclusions about these RTAs: (i) they increase welfare of partici-
pating countries; (ii) aggregate trade creation is much larger than trade
diversion; (iii) large welfare gains appear in models that incorporate features
of new trade theory; (iv) there are welfare gains from expanding membership;
and (v) global trade liberalisation increases welfare more than the formation
of an RTA. We also discuss the impact RTAs can have on agriculture, a
sector that until the Uruguay Round, had been largely exempt from
multilateral trade reforms. Many countries provide domestic support to
agriculture, complicating eﬀorts to reduce trade barriers. We conclude with a
brief review of ‘‘new trade theory’’ models which incorporate links between
increased trade and economic performance beyond the standard neoclassical
theory of comparative advantage. We argue that RTAs encourage changes in
the production structure as countries have secure access to RTA-partners
markets. These gains, which we describe as ‘‘Smithian’’ because they are
related to ﬁner specialisation in production, are potentially much bigger than
the welfare numbers associated with trade creation and trade diversion in a
Heckscher-Ohlin framework.
2. Trade creation and trade diversion
2.1 Theory
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (2000, 1998) argue that
RTAs will likely reduce welfare in member countries and impede multilateral
trade liberalisation. Because RTAs give preferential treatment to member
countries they divert trade from non-member, least-cost suppliers. They
argue that this trade diversion is likely to dominate trade creation so the
RTA will reduce welfare in member countries.
4 To illustrate the trade
3 This empirical literature is seldom cited by those taking a dim view of RTAs. For example,
Srinivasan (1998, p. 61) states that the issue of whether or not RTAs are beneﬁcial, including
the crucial question of whether trade creation exceeds trade diversion, ‘… is simply a set of
empirically testable, though as yet untested, hypotheses’. This statement is hard to justify given
the volume of empirical work on this issue.
4 Wonnacott (1996) notes that trade diversion is not necessarily welfare-decreasing by
deﬁnition. Instead, he argues that trade diversion may increase welfare for the diverting
country and the world as a whole. Trade liberalisation between partners in an RTA may lead
to increased competition and specialisation; ﬁrms can exploit economies of scale when they
have a bigger market and the partner country may become the least cost supplier in this
environment. This is really a ‘‘new trade theory’’ argument. Early in the debate over
regionalism, economists such as Lipsey (1957), Gehrels (1956–1957), and Michaely (1976)
argued that welfare could improve in an RTA with trade diversion due to consumption gains,
which Viner did not include in his analysis.
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which two countries remove bilateral tariﬀs. They present the small union
case in which the rest of the world (ROW) is the least-cost supplier and faces
constant costs. The RTA partner faces increasing costs. When the RTA is
formed, the union partner cannot meet the import demand at a price less
than the tariﬀ inclusive price on sales from the ROW. The importer imports
both from its RTA partner and the ROW at the price set by the ROW. Total
imports are constant but the share from the ROW declines and the share
from the union partner increases. The liberalising country loses because it
foregoes tariﬀ revenue from the new union member but does not face a lower
internal price for the imported good. In this framework, the larger the trade
partner as a share of total imports, the bigger the tariﬀ revenue loss when an
RTA is formed. Similarly, the trade partner who initially has higher tariﬀs
loses from an RTA because more tariﬀ revenue is redistributed away from it.
As an example of the damage from this type of an RTA (e.g. one in which the
ROW is the least-cost supplier facing constant costs and the union partner
has increasing costs of production), Panagariya (1997) calculates welfare
losses as high as $3.26 billion for Mexico from NAFTA. As Mexico had
higher initial tariﬀs than the USA, its loss of tariﬀ revenue exceeds its gains
from preferential access to the USA market.
5 Similarly, Panagariya (1996)
projects losses for Latin America in a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA). Because Latin American countries have higher tariﬀs than the
USA, they will lose tariﬀ revenue when they enter an FTAA. In contrast,
when the union partner is the low-cost producer (maintaining the assumption
of constant costs, for simplicity), an RTA improves welfare in the liberalising
country. It beneﬁts as domestic prices decline and the RTA is purely trade
creating.
De Melo et al. (1993) note that the case of pure trade diversion,
emphasised in Panagariya (1998, 2000), while unambiguously welfare-
worsening, is too extreme a model to characterise actual RTAs.
6 They
present a more balanced view of the welfare eﬀects of an RTA in an
analytical model in which integration both creates and diverts trade. In this
case, the country that lowers its barriers against a trade partner faces a new
domestic price which is lower than the tariﬀ-inclusive mark-up over the
constant cost supplier (the ROW), but higher than the free trade price. The
welfare eﬀects on the tariﬀ-reducing country are ambiguous: it loses because
it has diverted all imports from the lowest cost supplier, but it beneﬁts
5 This calculation uses aggregate trade and tariﬀ numbers. Post-NAFTA studies using more
detailed data refute this prediction.
6 See also Winters (1996) and De Rosa (1998) for a discussion of the theory with models that
allow both trade creation and trade diversion.
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environment: (i) the higher the initial tariﬀ on a given sector, the larger the
beneﬁts and the smaller the costs of an RTA; (ii) the lower the post-RTA
tariﬀ on non-union countries, the less likely that the lower-priced goods of
the latter will be displaced; and (iii) the greater the complementarity in
import demands between the union partner, the greater the gains from an
RTA. The latter point suggests that there are large gains from an RTA
between developed and developing countries – such as the USA and Mexico
– which have diﬀerent factor endowments. Determining the net welfare
impact of an RTA in this model is an empirical issue.
Other studies of RTAs identify additional reasons for welfare gains. For
example, Burﬁsher et al. (2002b) ﬁnd that an RTA can improve welfare when
it forces a country to remove domestic distortions that are linked to trade
restrictions. Krueger (1999) notes that RTAs can lead to multilateralism
when they allow developing countries to ‘‘lock in’’ trade reforms, thereby
encouraging investment ﬂows. In addition, RTAs may permit member
countries to liberalise beyond what could be accomplished multilaterally.
2.2 Empirical evidence
The theoretical models suggest that the net impact of an RTA on trade
creation and trade diversion is ambiguous. It depends on the export capacity
of the partner country and how the world price from the RTA partner
compares to the world price from the least cost producer who is not an RTA
member. An RTA can be net trade-creating in one sector and net trade-
diverting in another sector. To determine the implications of an RTA for
aggregate welfare and trade patterns, one needs economy wide, multi-
sectoral, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. There is now a large
empirical literature using multi-country CGEmodels to analyse the impact of
RTAs. We will summarise conclusions from various surveys of this literature
and discuss representative studies.
7 As we note below, multi-country CGE
models diﬀer widely in terms of country and commodity coverage, assumed
market structure, policy detail, and speciﬁcation of macroeconomic closure.
In spite of these diﬀerences, surveys of these models support two general
conclusions about the empirical eﬀects of RTAs: (i) in aggregate, trade
7 We review nine surveys: Brown (1993) 12 studies; Francois and Shiells (1994) 10 studies;
Baldwin and Venables (1995) 6 studies; Burﬁsher and Jones (1998) 11 studies; DeRosa (1998)
15 studies; USA International Trade Commission (1992) 10 studies; (1998) 6 studies; Hertel
et al. (1999) 7 studies; Scollay and Gilbert (2000) 29 studies. While there is some overlap in
terms of the models included in these surveys we draw our conclusions from a total of 106
studies. See Robinson and Thierfelder (1999) for a discussion of results from other CGE
models, including summaries of a number of models.
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measured in terms of real GDP or equivalent variation – increases for
member countries.
There were numerous CGEmodels used to analyse the eﬀects of the
NAFTA. Surveys of this work (e.g. USA International Trade Commission
1992; Brown 1993; Francois and Shiells 1994) found that trade creation
dominated trade diversion. This result is robust across models that diﬀer in
terms of demand speciﬁcations (Armington versus monopolistic competition,
choice of functional form), market structure (perfect competition versus
imperfect competition), closure rules (international capital mobility, migra-
tion, full employment versus ﬁxed wage, and the trade balance), and inter-
temporal structure (static versus dynamic). As Brown notes, ‘a very large
fraction of Mexico’s trade is already directed toward the U.S. Consequently,
there is very little trade with the ROW [rest of the world] to divert.’ (p. 40).
8
Analysis of post-NAFTA data ﬁnds results consistent with the pre-
NAFTA conclusions that welfare improves for all members, with the largest
gains to Mexico and that trade creation dominates trade diversion. For
example, Burﬁsher et al. (2001) review the post-NAFTA studies and conclude
that NAFTA improved welfare with the largest gains going to Mexico.
Krueger (2000), an eloquent critic of regional trade agreements in the larger
debate, concludes that there is no evidence that NAFTA diverted trade from
non-NAFTA countries. Examining trade data from 1990–1997 at the three-
digit SITC level, she ﬁnds few sectors in which imports of any NAFTA
country from the rest of the world fell while rising within NAFTA. She ﬁnds,
‘[T]he evidence to date bears out most economists’ initial predictions: that for
the U.S. the impact of NAFTA has been relatively small, and that for
Mexico, changes in trade ﬂows to date do not give much support to the view
that NAFTA might be seriously trade diverting’ (p. 762).
Industry studies of trade patterns post-RTA ﬁnd trade diversion in some
sectors but that trade creation dominates. For example, Clausing (2001) uses
detailed commodity trade data to analyse the eﬀects of the Canada-USA
FTA on trade with non-members. She ﬁnds that the agreement had
substantial trade creation eﬀects, with little evidence of diversion. Wylie
and Wylie (1996) and Karemera and Ojah (1998) ﬁnd similar results for
NAFTA.
8 Brown’s perspective contradicts Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) who argue that the same
conditions – high trade shares with the USA and high tariﬀs – mean Mexico loses from
NAFTA because of trade diversion and the loss of tariﬀ revenue (p. 18). The diﬀerence
between the two approaches is the underlying assumption about the analytical model. Brown
presumes both trade creation and trade diversion are possible while Bhagwati and Panagariya
presume trade diversion dominates.
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the Americas (FTAA) and also ﬁnds that welfare improves following the
agreement. Even countries that lose preferential access to USA markets
beneﬁt from the FTAA. Other survey articles such as Baldwin and Venables
(1995) and DeRosa (1998) do not have a regional focus but rather review a
selection of articles describing results for each region. DeRosa (1998)
provides a summary table with changes in trade ﬂows and economic welfare
for studies of NAFTA, Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA), an Asian-Paciﬁc
Free Trade Area, a greater North American Free Trade Area, MERCOSUR,
Chilean accession to MERCOSUR, and Chilean accession to NAFTA. For
all studies that describe changes in intra-bloc and extra-bloc imports, trade
creation exceeds trade diversion. In general, there are welfare gains to
member countries.
9
Baldwin and Venables (1995) provide a summary of the theoretical issues
relating to RTAs as well as a survey of some empirical studies.
10 They note
that studies of EC92, which removed nontariﬀ barriers to trade in the EC
(modelled as reduction in intra-EC trade costs), showed that the EC gains
modestly.
11 There are small negative welfare eﬀects on EFTA.
12 However,
when the EC92 is extended to EFTA countries there are gains to both the EC
and the EFTA.
Scollay and Gilbert (2000) review CGEmodels of APE C. Consistent with
other studies of RTAs, they ﬁnd that most studies predict welfare gains for all
APEC members. They also ﬁnd that the South-East Asian countries with
higher trade barriers than the more developed APEC countries experienced
large allocative eﬃciency gains. Also, countries with high trade dependency
on the region experience bigger welfare gains than for those less dependent
on the region for trade. This result is consistent with empirical studies of
NAFTA in which Mexico experienced bigger welfare gains because it had
higher initial tariﬀs and higher trade dependency than other NAFTA
9 Harrison et al. (2002) ﬁnd, for certain elasticities, Chile’s membership into MERCOSUR
reduces welfare for Chile. However, in the analysis they also raise other tax instruments to
replace lost tariﬀ revenue. It may be the case that other second best eﬀects are responsible for
the welfare decline.
10 Their discussion of the CGEmodels of NAFTA come from the surveys in the USA
International Trade Commission (1992) and Francois and Shiells (1994) which are also
described earlier in the present paper.
11 They note that these studies focus on manufacturing, approximately one third of EC
GDP; they may understate the eﬀects of EC92 which also aﬀects services trade and ﬁnancial
market liberalisation.
12 They attribute the loss to EFTA to product shifting in models that have imperfect
competition.
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regionalism’’, (e.g. liberalisation should be on a most-favoured nation
(m.f.n.) basis). According to Scollay and Gilbert, the CGEstudies in which
APEC countries unilaterally liberalise, without requiring non-members to
reciprocate, ﬁnd the ‘‘free rider’’ eﬀects insigniﬁcant. They conclude that
there is little diﬀerence between ‘‘open regionalism’’ and an APEC-wide RTA
in terms of welfare gains to APEC members. Hertel et al. (1999) also review
studies of APEC. They conclude that increasing intra-regional trade does not
come at the expense of extra-regional trade, that is, the agreement is not trade
diverting.
In summary, empirical studies of RTAs using multi-country models such
as CGEmodels that are general enough to incorporate both trade creation
and trade diversion overwhelmingly ﬁnd that aggregate trade creation is
much larger than trade diversion and that the RTAs increase welfare. While
trade diversion can be shown to dominate in some analytical models, there is
no empirical evidence that this will be the case in any of the general
equilibrium models examined. Given the large body of empirical work
showing that trade creation dominates trade diversion in RTAs, Bhagwati
and Panagariya, who use theoretical models that focus on trade diversion to
argue that RTAs are a bad idea, appear to be tilting at windmills of their own
creation.
3. What do RTAs mean for agriculture?
Many RTAs result in more liberal trade in agriculture among members. (See
Sheﬃeld 1998, table 1, p. 95 for a summary of the treatment of agriculture in
selected RTAs.) Some agreements, such as the Closer Economic Relations
(CER) between Australia and New Zealand and the Baltic FTA among
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have free trade in agriculture. The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area (AFTA) includes agriculture in
its transition to an RTA by 2003. Other agreements, such as NAFTA and
MERCOSUR, liberalise trade in agriculture but maintain trade barriers for
sensitive products such as sugar in MERCOSUR. At the other extreme, the
European Free Trade Area (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechten-
stein) excludes agriculture.
Burﬁsher and Jones (1998) survey empirical studies which focus on the
implication of a variety of RTAs for USA agriculture. They ﬁnd the
following:
• USA agriculture can gain from participating in various RTAs. The
international terms of trade facing the USA in agriculture are expected to
improve, with an increase in farm export prices relative to import prices;
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divert trade from USA agriculture;
• Agriculture is the source of most USA gains from RTAs. Because agri-
culture still faces relatively high trade barriers in world markets, its
inclusion in trade agreements accounts for much of the USA gains from
RTAs;
• RTAs limit the ability of member countries to maintain independent farm
programs; and
• RTAs are generally net trade creating in agriculture; and, in some cases,
there is no aggregate trade diversion.
13
Trade liberalisation in agriculture is complicated by the fact that many
countries have domestic agricultural support programs that are incompatible
with free trade. To the extent that an RTA can induce countries to reform
domestic support programs, an RTA encourages deeper integration among
its members. Hertel et al. (1999) describe economy-wide models of trade
liberalisation with a focus on agriculture and domestic policy distortions and
ﬁnd that domestic distortions can oﬀset trade diversion eﬀects. For example,
as the EU expands to incorporate seven of the Central and Eastern European
countries (CEEC), the rest of the EU beneﬁts from replacing subsidised
domestic farm output with imports from new members.
14 Liapis and Tsigas
(1998) also examine the eﬀect of EU expansion to include CEEC. In their
simulation, the CEEC participate in the EU budget and receive CAP
payments. They ﬁnd trade diversion in agricultural products as EU imports
from third countries are replaced by CEEC countries who now receive output
subsidies in agriculture. However, it is net trade creating in the aggregate, as
they report that the trade balance increases in all regions, except the CEEC.
15
Burﬁsher et al. (2002b) examine the interaction between domestic reforms
and NAFTA. They consider the impact of trade liberalisation among the
USA, Canada, and Mexico in a model with and without domestic policy
reform. Between 1993 and 1997, the USA and Mexico lowered domestic
support levels and ‘‘decoupled’’ payments by making them independent of
13 They note that the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (CER), the
Canada–USA Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and MERCOSUR have all led to increased
agricultural trade with both partners and nonmembers, supporting the view that RTAs can
unleash growth in trade that beneﬁts members and nonmembers alike.
14 In this analysis, they assume that producer subsidies under the Common Agricultural
Program (CAP) are not extended to the Central and Eastern European countries who are the
low cost producers of agriculture.
15 In their model, changes in the CEEC reﬂect both tariﬀ reduction and output subsidies to
agriculture under the CAP which bias production towards agriculture. They note that there is
an increase in import demand for nonagricultural products in the CEEC.
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16 Burﬁsher et al.
consider trade liberalisation under NAFTA when countries use decoupled
domestic support, as reﬂected in the 1997 policies. They compare this to
NAFTA with domestic price support programs, as reﬂected in 1993 policies.
They ﬁnd that the welfare gains from NAFTA are larger for all members
when countries have decoupled domestic support. When countries maintain
price support programs, Mexico’s welfare declines under NAFTA because
free trade in corn dramatically raised the cost of its price support to domestic
corn producers.
The models with agricultural detail reinforce the message from economy-
wide models described earlier – trade creation dominates trade diversion.
Furthermore, they show that there are additional gains when the RTAs
induce countries to reform domestic policies.
4. Membership issues
Important to the theoretical debate is whether RTAs are ‘‘building blocs or
stumbling blocs’’ on the route to multilateral free trade.
17 Is there an
incentive for RTAs to expand and does this support or hinder further
multilateral trade liberalisation? A related issue is whether there is some
natural or optimal number of blocs in terms of global welfare and negotiating
strategies in multilateral free trade talks. Krugman (1993) uses an analytical
model to demonstrate that welfare is higher at small and large number of
blocs, and is minimised with three blocs. Frankel et al. (1995) elaborate on
Krugman’s model and show that an RTA formed along natural continental
lines can also reduce welfare under certain conditions (such RTAs are termed
‘‘super-natural’’).
Empirical models can oﬀer some insights into these issues. In general,
studies ﬁnd that there are incentives for countries to participate in RTAs. The
results support the domino theory of regionalism as described in Baldwin and
Venables (1995). Brown et al. (1995) simulate an expansion of NAFTA,
adding one Latin American country at a time. They ﬁnd that, as NAFTA
16 Mexico, under its PROCAMPO program in 1993, eliminated price supports for domestic
agriculture and replaced them with an income transfer based on historical acreage. The 1996
USA FAIR act also shifted towards household income supplements and away from market
support. The purpose of the changes in each country was to make agriculture more responsive
to market conditions. Through emergency measures in 1998–2001, and established formally
under the 2002 USA Farm Bill, the USA has re-emphasised price support programs. An
analysis of the eﬀects of those programs are beyond the scope of the present paper. See
Burﬁsher et al. (2002c) for an analysis of how domestic support programs in OECD countries
interact.
17 Bhagwati (1993) originally coined this phrase which characterised the debate over RTAs.
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for the included countries increase. Similarly, Brown et al. (1996) describe the
eﬀects of an East Asian trade bloc. They begin with trade liberalisation
between Japan and South Korea and add incrementally, Taiwan and
Singapore. They ﬁnd that welfare increases for the included partners as well
as the new partner as the East Asian trade bloc expands.
Bach et al. (2000) analyse the eﬀect of EU enlargement, focusing on
agricultural sectors and policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and the EU Commission Agenda 2000 proposal. They ﬁnd welfare
gains for new member countries and a slight welfare loss for the EU
countries. The welfare changes primarily reﬂect a redistribution of income
from Western European taxpayers to Eastern European farmers, not trade
diversion losses. Frandsen et al. (2000) evaluate the eﬀects of EU expansion
on non-members. They ﬁnd slight trade diversion and minor welfare losses in
some non-member regions. Other regions enjoy minor welfare gains. On net,
they ﬁnd global welfare increases by 0.5 billion (constant 1995 USA dollars)
with a total gain to non-members of 0.4 billion and a European gain of
0.1 billion.
Empirical models also ﬁnd that the type of membership matters. Lewis
et al. (1995) analyse the implications of diﬀerent memberships in an RTA
among APEC countries. They ﬁnd that there are welfare gains from making
the APEC RTA as broad as possible. Omitting any one region makes that
region signiﬁcantly worse oﬀ and also lowers the gains from the RTA for all
members. Exclusion of the USA has the greatest negative impact on all
potential members. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that all countries individually
gain more from global liberalisation than they do from joining an APEC
RTA alone. While the formation of a regional RTA may be politically easier
than achieving continued global liberalisation, there are economic incentives
for all parties to expand on the achievements of the completed GATT round.
Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. (1995) experiment with an extension of NAFTA to
include Central America and the Carribean. They ﬁnd that the USA and
Mexico each prefers to be the sole hub, adding ‘‘spokes’’ through bilateral
agreements with new countries, but without full expansion of the RTA. It is
the worst outcome for either the USA or Mexico to be just a spoke while the
other country is the hub – they gain more from expansion of the RTA
(although, particularly for the USA, the numbers are small).
Benjamin (1994) uses an empirical model to address Krugman’s descrip-
tion of the relationship between global welfare and the size of an RTA. She
varies the countries included in a variety of potential RTAs and ﬁnds that, in
all cases, trade liberalisation increases the volume of world trade and
generates positive welfare gains. Contradicting Bhagwati and Panagariya,
who claim that higher trade dependency among potential partners reduces
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theoretical model with only trade diversion), she ﬁnds that higher trade
volumes between potential bloc partners enhance beneﬁts to bloc partners
and increase the eﬃciency gains from tariﬀ reduction.
Scollay and Gilbert (2000), in their review of CGEmodels of APE C, ﬁnd
that overall welfare gains are larger as the APEC RTA expands. The USA
International Trade Commission (1998) survey of studies of trade liberali-
sation among APEC countries ﬁnds a similar conclusion in studies that look
at membership issues: ‘ASEAN countries gain the most from the broadest
possible regional liberalisation.’ (p. 17). Furthermore, they note that the
presence of large countries, the USA and Japan, is important for other
ASEAN members.
5. Where are the big numbers?
Much of the theoretical analysis of the potential impact of trade liberalisation
has been done using neoclassical trade models. The gains from increased
trade arise from countries being able to pursue comparative advantage based
on having diﬀerent factor endowments (as described in the Heckscher-Ohlin
model). Is this the correct framework to show the eﬀects of RTAs or, for that
matter, global liberalisation? Analysis with neoclassical models seems to get
the sign right, but the magnitude wrong – trade liberalisation in these models
leads to welfare gains, but empirically they appear to be too small considering
the experience of countries which shifted to ‘‘open’’ development strategies.
The failure of the neoclassical model to provide an adequate empirical
framework for explaining the growth of open economies provided a strong
impetus to trade economists to explore other links between trade and
economic performance. The development of ‘‘new trade theory’’ is at least
partly a reaction to this failure, as trade economists undertook a search for
large numbers.
5.1 New trade theory
In new trade theory both theoretical and empirical models have moved
beyond looking only at neoclassical market structures to incorporate features
such as increasing returns, imperfect competition, technology transfers, trade
externalities, and dynamic eﬀects such as links between trade liberalisation,
total factor productivity growth, and capital stock accumulation. These
eﬀects are potentially large, and studies incorporating them appear to capture
better the stylised facts characterising growth in countries that shifted from
‘‘closed’’ to ‘‘open’’ strategies. Empirical studies of RTAs incorporating
elements of new trade theory invariably ﬁnd that trade creation greatly
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the increased growth of RTA members leads to expanded trade both within
the RTA and between member countries and the rest of the world.
Brown (1993) and Francois and Shiells (1994) describe empirical models
with new trade theory features and discuss the implications for trade
liberalisation. Brown describes the evolution of models from (i) static models
with neoclassical market structures to (ii) static models with monopolistic
competition and increasing returns to scale and (iii) dynamic models in which
either exogenous variables are updated using projected values or agents
optimise production and consumption decisions intertemporally. Baldwin
and Venables (1995) and DeRosa (1998) also consider models with new trade
theory features, but do not provide analysis of the model features.
In all cases, the welfare gains from an RTA are greater as the models
become more sophisticated. When the models incorporate imperfect compe-
tition and increasing returns to scale, for example, trade liberalisation allows
producers to realise economies of scale. Brown ﬁnds that Mexico’s gain from
NAFTA, measured as the per cent increase in real income, is always bigger
with increasing returns to scale, often by an order of magnitude. Likewise,
Francois and Shiells (1994) ﬁnd that models with some form of imperfect
competition yield larger results than those with perfect competition.
Trade externalities are another change in the production process associated
with an RTA (or any agreement which expands trade).
18 Increased
competition may induce domestic producers to operate more eﬃciently.
While there is fairly widespread agreement that feedbacks exist, there is little
consensus on the channels through which they operate and how big they
are.
19 Lewis et al. (1995) explore the eﬀects of trade externalities by linking
total factor productivity in a sector to its share of exports in production. The
eﬀects operate through a simple elasticity equation. They ﬁnd that Asian
FTA is beneﬁcial to all members when there are trade-productivity links:
GDP, absorption, and consumption all rise for all participants. More
recently, this type of trade-induced productivity link has been an important
18 DeMelo and Robinson (1992) incorporate the relationship as an externality in an
analytical trade model. Total factor productivity growth is a function of the growth of
manufacturing exports. On the import side, there is an externality arising from the import of
capital goods.
19 Rather than introduce an externality to explain the trade productivity link, Rutherford
and Tarr (2002) identify the increased variety of intermediate inputs available as the source of
productivity growth attributable to trade liberalisation. In their analysis ﬁrms use a Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregate of intermediate inputs. When the variety of intermediate inputs increases due
to trade liberalisation, producers can select intermediate inputs that more closely match
production requirements. This is a source of productivity gains.
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and the WTO (e.g. Diao et al. 2001; Burﬁsher et al. 2002a).
The welfare gains of an RTA are bigger still in models that incorporate
dynamics. Modellers include dynamics either by (i) specifying a time path for
one or more of the exogenous variables and resolving the static model each
period with the new values; (ii) endogenising the growth of some variables in
the system; or (iii) solving all time periods simultaneously with intertemporal
optimisation by producers and consumers. For example, Manchester and
McKibbin (1995) analyse NAFTA in a CGEmodel with changes in ﬁnancial
and real capital ﬂows that respond to increasing total factor productivity and
declining risk premiums in Mexico. They ﬁnd that ‘the ﬂow of investment to
Mexico leads to a boost in U.S. exports and raises aggregate demand, thereby
reinforcing the other positive eﬀects of NAFTA on the U.S. economy.’
(p. 204).
20
5.2 Smithian gains from trade
While the literature on new trade theory is quite large, there is unease in the
profession as to whether we have correctly identiﬁed the major eﬀects at
work. The research program is still active and involves a continuing interplay
between theory, econometric estimation and the development of empirical
models incorporating new theoretical features. Empirical results from
simulation models such as CGEmodels have played an important part in
this work program by quantifying, in a general equilibrium framework, the
mechanisms identiﬁed in new theoretical models.
As noted earlier, one of the ‘‘stylised facts’’ characterising the formation of
some RTAs is a rapid increase in intra-industry trade, especially in
intermediate goods.
21 In the literature, the increase in trade in intermediate
goods has been called vertical specialisation (Hummels et al. 1998),
fragmentation (Deardorﬀ 1998a, 1998b), outsourcing (Feenstra 1998) and
product sharing (Yeats 1999). In all cases, there are gains from ﬁner
specialisation in production based on factor proportion diﬀerences. For
example, Hummels et al. (1998) describe vertical specialisation, by which a
good is produced in multiple sequential stages, with two or more countries
specialising in the production of one but not all stages. The good that uses the
20 In general, the CGEstudies of NAFTA focused on trade linkages. The few models that
did incorporate dynamics did so as exogenous increase in the capital stock for Mexico. Brown
et al. (1992), Brown (1993), and Robinson et al. (1993) ﬁnd an exogenous increase in
Mexico’s capital stock in conjunction with NAFTA leads to greater welfare gains for Mexico.
Manchester and McKibbin (1995) are the notable exception in the analysis of NAFTA.
21 See Jones (2000) for a discussion of the theory of trade in intermediates.
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certain aspects of the production process, depending upon their endowment
diﬀerences. Hummels et al. (1998) note that there are additional gains from
trade liberalisation as it eliminates multiple taxation on trade in intermediate
goods and the ﬁnal product. Deardorﬀ (1998a,b) describes the theoretical
properties of this type of trade in goods produced in intermediate stages
which he calls fragmentation. He describes the implications for Ricardian
and Heckscher-Ohlin trade models and the eﬀects on factor prices.
Outsourcing is a related topic to vertical integration. With outsourcing a
ﬁrm relocates stages of production to exploit diﬀerences in endowments and
factor costs. See Feenstra (1998) for a survey of the impact of outsourcing
and increased trade in intermediates on employment and wages. Yeats (1999)
labels trade in intermediate goods as product sharing. He estimates the
amount of product sharing that occurs in machinery and transportation
equipment and ﬁnds that at least 30 per cent of total world trade in
manufacturing is in components. Trade in components has been growing
faster than trade in ﬁnal products.
Trade-focused CGEmodels capture the observed increase in intra-industry
trade by specifying that foreign goods are imperfect substitutes for
domestically produced goods, which allows two-way trade (or ‘‘cross
hauling’’) at the sectoral level. Increases in intra-sectoral trade are often a
major source of trade creation in these models, but the models do not
attempt to sort out the nature of such trade at the micro level. The underlying
motivation cannot really be diﬀerences in factor proportions, because we
observe increased trade in sectors where factor proportions are similar across
countries.
We conjecture that increases in intra-sectoral trade arise from the fact that
an RTA provides an expanded secure market and permits ﬁrms to pursue
economies of ﬁne specialisation. In North America, for example, the auto
industry has become incredibly diﬀused, with factories specialising in various
parts located in diﬀerent countries. Such diﬀusion of production would be
impossible if international borders represented serious and uncertain barriers
to the free ﬂow of components. The RTA provides producers scope for ﬁne
specialisation extending beyond national markets. In this environment,
eﬃciency gains from increased trade in an RTA arise from economies of scale
in ﬁne specialisation – Adam Smith’s pin factory in international markets.
22
These eﬃciency gains do not arise from diﬀerences in factor endowments but
from the extent of the market:
22 Note that these productivity gains are diﬀerent from welfare gains to demanders from
increased product diversity, as suggested by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). These ‘‘Smithian’’ gains
would apply to intermediate goods as well as goods for ﬁnal demand.
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division of labor, so the extent of this division must always be
limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the
extent of the market.’ (Smith 1904).
Wood (1995) notes that production processes in developed and developing
countries are already so diﬀerent, that ‘developed countries have become
specialized producers of skill-intensive manufactures and imports of labor-
intensive manufactures are now ‘noncompeting’ with domestic production’
(p. 65).
23 We extrapolate from Wood’s description of production diﬀerences
between developed and developing countries and argue that such speciali-
sation may also generate additional eﬃciency gains from an RTA. When
countries have incentives to increase trade, perhaps arising from diﬀerences
in factor endowments, and form an RTA that provides an integrated, secure
market, then there will also be incentives for producers to exploit Smithian
gains as well. From this perspective it is shortsighted to focus on Meade-
Viner trade creation/trade diversion issues when assessing the impact of
RTAs, because there may well be potential Smithian gains not considered in
the standard model.
6. Conclusion
The theoretical debate over RTAs raises a number of issues. A fundamental
question is do RTAs improve welfare and if so, what are the sources of these
gains? Related to that concern, are RTAs net trade creating or trade
diverting? Finally, are RTAs building-blocks or stumbling-blocks to multi-
lateral trade liberalisation?
There is a large body of empirical literature which oﬀers answers to these
questions. In the present paper, we summarised the lessons from multi-
country CGEmodels of RTAs and found:
• trade creation greatly exceeds trade diversion in virtually all RTAs
studied. In general, welfare for all members increases. Furthermore,
welfare for old members increases as new members join the RTA, sug-
gesting that there are gains from expanding the RTA;
• features from new trade theory such as imperfect competition, increasing
returns to scale, trade externalities, or dynamics generate larger welfare
23 Wood uses this description of production in developed versus developing countries to
argue that factor content studies underestimate the impact imports have on demand for
unskilled labor in developed countries. They must account for the fact that diﬀerences in
factor costs between developed and developing countries mean labor per unit of output diﬀers.
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structures and;
• domestic policy reforms in conjunction with an RTA provide additional
welfare gains. Models with detailed agricultural sectors illustrate this
point.
Given the overwhelming empirical evidence that RTAs improve welfare,
the current debate in the literature over trade creation versus trade
diversion is distracting, diverting attention from the more important issue –
what are the sources of the large welfare gains which encourage countries
to participate in RTAs? From the empirical analysis, we know that
neoclassical models of RTAs yield small welfare gains and models that
incorporate aspects of the new trade theory yield bigger welfare gains. We
described another potential link between increased trade and productivity.
RTAs, because they create reliable market access, will encourage ﬁner
specialisation in production. In addition to diﬀerences in endowments (the
source of gains from trade in neoclassical trade theory) there are eﬃciency
gains from widening the extent of the market. The beneﬁts from increased
trade in this situation are Smithian and represent an important area for
further research.
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